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E heard, “[we are] not a hospital and [we are not] doctors” as she 
lay for eight days bleeding out and crying as she miscarried, losing her 
son during the fourth month of her pregnancy.1 Emma heard, “No, don’t 
tell me anything. You all say the same thing,” as she tried to explain 
that she was a pregnant as a result of rape.2 Teresa heard no response 
as she complained on several different occasions that she was in pain, 
that she was bleeding profusely despite being four months pregnant, 
and that she needed to go to a hospital.3 
What do E, Emma, and Teresa have in common? They were all 
pregnant immigrant detainees confined to United States detention cen-
ters who were shackled around their hands, legs, and stomach. 
In December 2017, the Trump administration instituted a Depart-
ment of Homeland Security policy allowing for the detention of preg-
nant women in their first and second trimesters.4 The new Immigration 
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 1 Ema O’Connor & Nidhi Prakash, Pregnant Women Say They Miscarried in Immigration 
Detention and Didn’t Get the Care They Needed, BUZZFEED NEWS (July 9, 2018), https://www.buzzf 
eednews.com/article/emaoconnor/pregnant-migrant-women-miscarriage-cpb-ice-detention-trump 
[https://perma.cc/P8BQ-H7U8]. 
 2 American Civil Liberties Union et al., Re: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s D-  
etention and Treatment of Pregnant Women, AMERICAN IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, 7–8 (2017), https:// 
www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/general_litigation/complaint_increasing 
_numbers_of_pregnant_women_facing_harm_in_detention.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9JP-QPGM]. 
 3 Id. at 8–9. 
 4 ICE Directive 11032.3: Identification and Monitoring of Pregnant Detainees, U.S. IMMIGRAT- 
ION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 1 (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/docume 
nts/Document/2018/11032_3_PregnantDetaineP.pdf [https://perma.cc/RL3K-5HD4]. See also Vict- 
oria López, Working to Uncover How ICE Treats Pregnant Women in Detention, ACLU: AMERICAN 
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (May 3, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/immigrants-rights/immigrants-
rights-and-detention/working-uncover-how-ice-treats-pregnant-women [https://perma.cc/ZL2E-K 
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and Customs Enforcement (ICE) directive, which failed to be announced 
until March despite its earlier implementation, ended the Obama ad-
ministration’s August 2016 policy to refrain from detaining pregnant 
women whose immigration cases are pending except in extreme circum-
stances.5 The 2016 policy change was prompted by ICE’s acknowledge-
ment of the larger consensus among humanitarian and medical organ-
izations that shackling and other forms of mistreatment are harmful to 
the health of expectant women and that its detention centers are not 
prepared to meet their unique medical needs.6 Due to President 
Trump’s executive orders on immigration,7 though, this reasonable ra-
tionale has been swept aside in favor of incarcerating pregnant women 
who have yet to reach their third trimester.8 The ICE directive has also 
eliminated reporting procedures that previously allowed outside agen-
cies to monitor ICE’s detention facilities and the treatment of women.9 
Furthermore, despite the new policy’s directions not to hold women 
in their third trimester and to provide appropriate medical care, preg-
nant detainees’ testimonies prove that this portion of the directive is 
being ignored.10 In fact, pregnant detainees often are not given proper 
medical care, are physically and psychologically mistreated, and are 
shackled around the stomach.11 The treatment within detention centers 
is often re-traumatizing for these women, especially since many of these 
women’s pregnancies are a result of sexual assaults.12 
Part I of this Comment describes in more detail the physical and 
mental suffering inflicted on pregnant detainees during their time in 
detention centers. It further discusses the ICE detention standards and 
the 2017 ICE directive’s contravention of them. Part II goes on to review 
42 U.S.C. § 198313 claims brought forth by past prisoners, alleging vio-
 
XGN]; Liz Jones, Pregnant and Detained, NPR: NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Apr.6, 2018), https://ww 
w.npr.org/2018/04/05/599802820/pregnant-and-detained [https://perma.cc/9E84-377W]; O’Connor, 
supra note 1. 
 5 ICE Policy 11032.2: Identification and Monitoring of Pregnant Detainee, U.S IMMIGRATION 
AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, 1 (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
Document/2016/11032.2_IdentificationMoIdentificationMonitoringP.pdf [https://perma.cc/5L4B-V 
F58]. See also Jones, supra note 4; O’Connor, supra note 1. 
 6 López, supra note 4. 
 7 See Exec. Order No. 13767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 30, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 
Fed. Reg. 8799 (Jan. 30, 2017); Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Feb. 1, 2017). 
 8 O’Connor, supra note 1. 
 9 López, supra note 4. 
 10 O’Connor, supra note 1. 
 11 See e.g., id. 
 12 At least three of the ten women who filed complaints testified to becoming pregnant as a 
result of sexual assaults, whether in their home country or on their journey into the United States. 
American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 6–9. 
 13 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
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lations of their Eighth Amendment rights under the deliberate indiffer-
ence standard. The Comment goes on to recognize that pretrial detain-
ees, though they are non-convicted, have been tried by courts under this 
same subjective standard. It points out, though, that a recent United 
States Supreme Court decision, Kingsley v. Hendrickson,14 applied an 
objective standard to a pretrial detainee’s excessive force claims. In 
turn, it has led to a circuit split in which the Ninth, Second, and Seventh 
Circuits interpret this objective standard to extend to all Fourteenth 
Amendment claims while the Fifth, Eleventh, and Eighth Circuits do 
not. Part III then evaluates how international law, through its conven-
tions and cases, has weighed in on the treatment of detainees and, thus, 
might affect courts’ decision making. 
Due to the broad wording of Kingsley and the similar injuries, both 
physical and constitutional, of excessive force and other Fourteenth 
Amendment claims, this Comment argues in Part IV that courts should 
interpret Kingsley to apply the objective standard to all Fourteenth 
Amendment, § 1983 claims of pretrial detainees. This reading not only 
is backed up by the Court’s decision in Kingsley, but also will provide a 
more favorable standard for pretrial detainees. Part V further asserts 
that international law, especially relevant given that pregnant detain-
ees are foreign nationals, supports this assertion and should be used by 
courts as persuasive authority. Finally, Part VI of this Comment re-
sponds to counterarguments by contending that current and pending 
domestic laws do not apply to or adequately protect pregnant pretrial 
detainees. 
Given the increasing number of pregnant detainees within U.S. de-
tention centers,15 this inhumane treatment needs to be legally ad-
dressed as soon as possible. In fact, the #MeToo Movement demands 
that this treatment of pregnant women be stopped and that their rights 
and dignity be acknowledged. This Comment concludes, then, that the 
best course of action courts can take is to extend the Kingsley decision 
to Fourteenth Amendment claims other than excessive force. Especially 
in light of the support provided by international law, such an interpre-
tation not only is legally correct but also would provide justice for preg-
nant immigrant detainees, who should have never been mistreated or 
shackled in the first place. 
 
 14 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015). 
 15 By April 2018, 506 pregnant women had already been detained since December’s policy 
reversal. Compare this to 292 pregnant women detained between January and May of 2017. Jones, 
supra note 4. 
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF ICE DETENTION CONDITIONS, STANDARDS, AND 
DIRECTIVES 
A. Physical and Mental Harms to Pregnant Detainees 
Pregnant detainees, who are often asylum seekers fleeing violence 
in their own countries, have shared similar accounts of inadequate med-
ical attention and mistreatment. They report detention officers ignoring 
their requests for or delaying medical care, even when they are in se-
vere pain, bleeding out, or miscarrying.16 Detention staff also failed to 
refer women with high-risk pregnancies to specialists.17 When women 
are given medical attention, their physicians often fail to inquire about 
their physical or mental state and to provide them with prenatal vita-
mins.18 Due to this inadequate health care, pregnant detainees report 
having headaches, abdominal pain, weakness, nausea, and vomiting.19 
Additionally, women attest that the detention centers are over-
crowded, the food makes them nauseous, the mattresses, if any, are 
thin, and viruses, such those causing the flu and diarrhea, are ram-
pant.20 Emma, mentioned in the introduction, said that she could not 
sleep at the facility due to the crying of the detained children.21 
In addition, shackling of pregnant detainees persists despite being 
a dangerous practice that poses unacceptable health risks to expectant 
mothers and children.22 Restraints can leave deep gashes on expectant 
mothers’ ankles, bruise their abdomens, and decrease their stability, 
which increases their likelihood of falling, harming themselves or their 
child, and miscarrying.23 During labor, shackling prevents physicians 
 
 16 American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 5. For example, Teresa, mentioned 
in the Introduction, eventually miscarried due to lack of medical attention and was later denied 
any pain relief medication, causing her to have headaches and dramatically lose weight. Id. at 9. 
 17 Id. 
 18 One doctor even failed to give a twenty-four-year-old Honduran her vaccinations; instead, 
he gave them to her five-year-old daughter who had already received them. Id. at 7, 12. 
 19 See, e.g., López, supra note 4. See also Jones, supra note 4 (recounting Jacinta Morales’ 
similar detention conditions that eventually led to her miscarriage). It should be noted that, aside 
from nausea and vomiting, these are not common pregnancy symptoms. Furthermore, these 
women reported being nauseous and vomiting after being detained. See What Are Some Common 
Signs of Pregnancy?, NICHD: EUNICE KENNEDY SHRIVER NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CHILD HEALTH 
AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (2018), https://www.nichd.nih.gov/health/topics/pregnancy/condition-
info/signs [https://perma.cc/ZGY6-FQYS]. 
 20 American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 6, 7, 11. 
 21 Id. at 8. 
 22 See O’Connor, supra note 1; Hilary Hammell, The International Human Right to Safe and 
Humane Treatment During Pregnancy and a Theory for Its Application in U.S. Courts, 33 WOMEN’S 
RTS. L. REP. 244, 250 n.49 (2012) (citing a Human Rights Watch report that found pregnant women 
in immigration detention are routinely shackled.). 
 23 See Committee on Health Care for Underserved Women, Health Care for Pregnant and 
Postpartum Incarcerated Women and Adolescent Females, THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRIC- 
IANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS (Nov. 2011), https://www.acog.org/-/media/Committee-Opinions/Commit 
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from safely assisting pregnant women, limits women’s critical need to 
move during labor, and causes complications such as hemorrhaging and 
decreased fetal heart rate.24 It may also delay a woman’s caesarian sec-
tion, which could cause permanent brain damage to the child.25 Post-
partum shackling may prevent women from healing properly and 
breast-feeding.26 
Pregnant women’s mental health is endangered in detention as 
well. The lack of access to health care, the physical harms suffered, the 
separation from their families, and the uncertainty of immigration pro-
ceedings leave pregnant detainees severely stressed. Indeed, most 
women have attested to feeling isolated, depressed, and anxious.27 
Many pregnant detainees are also survivors of abuse and are either 
fleeing their abuser or are pregnant due to sexual assault.28 They often 
find the mistreatment in the detention facilities and the preparation for 
a credible fear interview29 with an asylum officer to be re-traumatiz-
ing.30 All interviewed pregnant detainees worried that this mental pres-
sure adversely affected their pregnancies; this fear of stress thus causes 
pregnant detainees to be more stressed.31 Acute stress during preg-
nancy, especially in the final trimester, could then lead to preterm 
births,32 which often lead to higher rates of child death or disability.33 
 
tee-on-Health-Care-for-Underserved-Women/co511.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20181030T0057284577 [https 
://perma.cc/A4SK-XHYM]; The ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project and ACLU National Prison 
Project, ACLU Briefing Paper: The Shackling of Pregnant Women & Girls in U.S. Prisons, Jails & 
Youth Detention Centers, ACLU: AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, 3 (2018), https://www.aclu.org 
/files/assets/anti-shackling_briefing_paper_stand_alone.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GDZ-G265]. 
 24 See Committee on Health Care for Underserved Women, supra note 23; United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, Handbook on Women and Imprisonment 20 (2nd ed. 2014). See also 
The ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project and ACLU National Prison Project, supra note 23, at 4. 
 25 See Committee on Health Care for Underserved Women, supra note 23; United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, Handbook on Women and Imprisonment 20 (2nd ed. 2014); see also 
The ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project and ACLU National Prison Project, supra note 23, at 4. 
 26 See Dana L. Sichel, Giving Birth in Shackles: A Constitutional and Human Rights Viola-
tion, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 223, 225 (2007); The ACLU Reproductive Freedom Pro-
ject and ACLU National Prison Project, supra note 23, at 3 (citing Dr. Patricia Garcia’s statement 
to the Chicago Legal Aid to Incarcerated Mothers in December 1998). 
 27 See American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 5–12. 
 28 American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 2, 6–9. 
 29 This is an interview with an asylum officer to establish a credible fear of persecution. Amer-
ican Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 2. 
 30 For example, a twenty-eight-year-old from Honduras attested to the traumatic preparation 
for her credible fear interview in which she was forced to disclose her history of domestic and 
sexual violence in detail. American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 6. 
 31 Id. at 5. 
 32 This is the testimony of Sera Bonds, founder and CEO of Circle of Health International, 
who has cared pregnant women after they have been released from detention centers. Madhuri 
Sathish, Pregnant Immigrants Are Being Shackled at the Border & Lawmakers Want to End That 
Practice, BUSTLE (July 26, 2018), https://www.bustle.com/p/pregnant-immigrants-are-being-shack 
led-at-the-border-lawmakers-want-to-end-that-practice-9892600 [https://perma.cc/L6RB-HRDY]. 
 33 Disabilities include “breathing problems, feeding difficulties, cerebral palsy, developmental 
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B. ICE Standards and Directives 
To deter such harms, medical organizations34 have drafted preg-
nancy-related care standards to guide prisons and jails. In addition to 
condemning the shackling of pregnant women, they recommend thor-
oughly documenting all pregnancies and the care provided, screening 
and counseling women, referring high-risk pregnancies to the appropri-
ate physicians, and providing essential prenatal care.35 
ICE adopted the medical organizations’ standards in the 2011 ICE 
Performance Based National Detention Standard (PBNDS) on Medical 
Care for Women. ICE acknowledges that pregnancy constitutes a spe-
cial vulnerability and may put detainees at a higher risk for victimiza-
tion or assault.36 Detention centers must provide prenatal care and 
counseling “inclusive of, but not limited to: nutrition, exercise, compli-
cations of pregnancy, prenatal vitamins, labor and delivery, postpartum 
care, lactation, family planning, abortion services, and parental skills 
education.”37 Detention centers must also offer pregnant detainees 
“temperature-appropriate” clothing and blankets, beds in their holding 
cells, and more food during meals.38 The PBNDS also bars the shackling 
of women who are pregnant or recovering post-partum, “‘absent truly 
extraordinary circumstances.’”39 
Following the PBNDS and recognizing the harms of detaining preg-
nant women, the Obama administration released a policy in August 
2016 barring the detention of pregnant women unless the mandatory 
detention statute applied or “extraordinary circumstances” existed.40 If 
 
delay, vision problems, and hearing problems.” Preterm Birth, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AN- 
D PREVENTION (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/pret 
ermbirth.htm [https://perma.cc/5VW9-H6A7]. 
 34 These include the National Commission on Correctional Health Care (NCCHC), American 
Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), and American Public Health Association 
(APHA). 
 35 American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 4 (citing Committee Opinion: Health 
Care for Pregnant and Postpartum Incarcerated Women and Adolescent Females, THE AMERICAN  




 36 ICE Performance Based Detention Standards, 2.2 Custody Classification System, U.S. 
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (rev. Dec. 2016) 62, 70, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/dete 
ntion-standards/2011/2-2.pdf [https://perma.cc/GA9K-W9Y7]. 
 37 American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 4. See also ICE Performance Based 
Detention Standards, 4.4 Medical Care (Women), U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT 
(rev. Dec. 2016) 324–25, https://www.ice.gov/doclib/detention-standards/2011/4-4.pdf [https://perm 
a.cc/SYC8-KM6J]. 
 38 American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 4. 
 39 Id. (citation omitted). 
 40 ICE Policy 11032.2: Identification and Monitoring of Pregnant Detainee, supra note 5. See 
also American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 3. 
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a pregnant woman was detained, ICE needed to evaluate each week 
whether her continued confinement was necessary.41 In spite of this di-
rective, attorneys and other advocates reported in November 2016 that 
detention centers and officers continued to detain and shackle pregnant 
immigrant women.42 
A little over a year later, in December 2017, the Trump administra-
tion repealed this directive and gave ICE the power to detain pregnant 
women in their first and second trimesters.43 Its policy also removes the 
mandated reporting mechanisms through which outside organizations 
monitored ICE’s detention centers and treatment of pregnant detain-
ees.44 Given this extension of ICE’s abilities and lack of supervision, 
hundreds—and counting—of pregnant immigrant women have contin-
ued to be detained, shackled, and subjected to inhumane conditions.45 
II. DOMESTIC LAW: THE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE STANDARD VS. 
THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD 
When subjected to repeated abuses and mistreatment, pregnant 
immigrant detainees are afforded avenues to bring forth cases against 
detention officials, medical staff, detention centers, and the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security. Historically, pregnant detainees, like con-
victed prisoners, have brought suits under 42 U.S.C. § 198346 against 
state actors, claiming violations of their Eighth Amendment47 rights, 
which are extended to pretrial detainees through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.48 But a recent Supreme Court decision, Kingsley v. Hen-
drickson,49 suggests that pregnant detainees are entitled to more pro-
tection than convicted prisoners and that they should be tried under a 
different standard, which has led to a circuit split. 
 
 41 ICE Policy 11032.2: Identification and Monitoring of Pregnant Detainee, supra note 5. 
 42 American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2, at 3. 
 43 ICE Directive 11032.3: Identification and Monitoring of Pregnant Detainees, supra note 4. 
See also López, supra note 4. 
 44 Id. 
 45 López, supra note 4. 
 46 42 U.S.C § 1983 (2012) (providing the cause of action for a claim that “[a] person . . . under 
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State” violated a federally 
protected constitutional or statutory right). 
 47 U.S. Const. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 48 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws.”). 
 49 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015). 
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A. Eighth Amendment Protections Afforded Convicted Pregnant 
Prisoners (and Extended to Pregnant Detainees) 
Given that courts have historically viewed pregnant detainees’ 
cases under the same standard as those of pregnant prisoners, it is 
worthwhile to explore the history and merits of those cases. This history 
begins with Estelle v. Gamble.50 
In Estelle, the Supreme Court acknowledged prisoners’ right to re-
ceive adequate medical treatment. The Court held that prison officials’ 
deliberate indifference to incarcerated persons’ serious medical needs 
constitutes the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” and thus 
violates the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel and unusual 
punishment.51 Indeed, denying prisoners medical care could cause them 
pain and suffering that does not serve a legitimate penological pur-
pose.52 Furthermore, the Court found that prison guards’ intentional 
denial or delay of prisoners’ access to medical care constitutes deliber-
ate indifference.53 Thus, the Court in Estelle created the deliberate in-
difference standard, a subjective standard requiring plaintiffs to show 
that the defendant intended harm and actually believed harm would 
likely occur.54 
By 1994, the Supreme Court in Farmer v. Brennan55 established 
that two elements must be satisfied to establish that defendants vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiffs must show that defendants: (1) 
exposed them to a substantial risk of serious harm56 and (2) were delib-
erately indifferent to their constitutional rights.57 The Court acknowl-
edged that deliberate indifference was a vague phrase and attempted 
to clarify it as a standard of reckless disregard, though it acknowledged 
that this explanation was equally vague.58 By this time, the Court had 
 
 50 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
 51 Id. at 104–05 (citing to Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)). 
 52 Id. at 103. 
 53 Id. at 104. 
 54 See, e.g., Pittman ex rel. Hamilton v. Cty. of Madison, 746 F.3d 766, 775–76 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 55 511 U.S. 825 (1994). 
 56 Id. at 834 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991) and Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 
U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). 
 57 Id. at 834 (quoting Wilson, 501 U.S. at 302–03). See also Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio, 836 
F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2016) (stating the two necessary elements). 
 58 Id. at 836–37 (concluding that a prison official cannot be found liable under the Eighth 
Amendment for denying an inmate humane conditions of confinement unless the official knows of 
and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts 
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he 
must also draw the inference). 
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also extended the deliberate indifference standard to other types of 
claims such as failure-to-protect59 and conditions of confinement.60 
Pretrial detainees, though, have different standing than prisoners. 
Detainees, unlike sentenced inmates, have yet to be tried for their 
crimes.61 Given this lack of adjudication of guilt, courts must scrutinize 
pretrial detainees’ claims under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment.62 Whereas the Eighth 
Amendment allows for the punishment of sentenced prisoners so long 
as it is not cruel and unusual, the Due Process Clause mandates that 
pretrial detainees not be punished.63 
Despite this acknowledged difference, courts have usually exam-
ined the claims of pretrial detainees under the Eighth Amendment’s 
standards. This is due to the Supreme Court’s vague explanation of 
what deprivations the state can subject pretrial detainees to short of 
punishment. Indeed, the Court in Bell v. Wolfish64 stated that, while a 
detainee does not have a fundamental liberty interest under the Four-
teenth Amendment to be free from discomfort, a condition or restriction 
of pretrial detention must be “reasonably related to a legitimate gov-
ernmental objective.”65 Given this ambiguous and broad definition, 
courts have relied on the Court’s repeated assertion that pretrial de-
tainees’ due process rights “are at least as great as the Eighth Amend-
ment protections available to a convicted prisoner”66 to extend Eighth 
Amendment scrutiny to pretrial detainees’ claims. 
Under these Eighth Amendment standards, both pregnant prison-
ers and pregnant detainees have brought § 1983 claims alleging delib-
erate indifference to their serious medical needs. Circuits, though, have 
interpreted the deliberate indifference standard differently. 
 
 59 Id. at 837. 
 60 Wilson, 501 U.S. at 303. 
 61 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 (1979). 
 62 Id. at 535, 535 n.16. 
 63 Id. See also Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977) (“Eighth Amendment scru-
tiny is appropriate only after the State has complied with the constitutional guarantees tradition-
ally associated with criminal prosecutions.”); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 317–18 (1946) 
(“[T]he State does not acquire the power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is concerned 
until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law. 
Where the State seeks to impose punishment without such an adjudication, the pertinent consti-
tutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 64 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963) and 
Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)). 
 65 Id. at 539. 
 66 City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). See also Bell, 441 U.S. at 545. 
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1. The Second, Eighth, and Sixth Circuits have found inade-
quate medical care and shackling to meet the deliberate indif-
ference standard 
The Second Circuit heard the case of a pregnant prisoner who 
claimed that county jail officials intentionally delayed her medical care 
when she suffered severe pain and subsequently miscarried.67 Despite 
disagreements on the plaintiff’s health status and timing of emergency 
medical care, the Second Circuit stated that “[t]hese assertions, how-
ever disputed, do raise material factual issues.68 After all, if the defend-
ants did decide to delay emergency medical aid—even for ‘only’ five 
hours—in order to make Archer suffer, surely a claim would be stated 
under Estelle.”69 
The Eighth Circuit has also found ignoring pregnant prisoners’ 
bleeding constitutes deliberate indifference and violates their right to 
medical care. In Boswell v. Sherburne,70 a pregnant pretrial detainee 
told the county jail upon her admittance to the county that she was 
pregnant and experiencing troubling symptoms.71 Despite being alerted 
to her medical condition, jailers ignored her constant bleeding, her pas-
sage of blood clots, her cramping, and her requests for a physician.72 
When she was finally transferred to a hospital, she gave birth in the 
ambulance and lost her newborn son thirty-four minutes later.73 The 
Eighth Circuit found that officials’ denial of her requests violated her 
right to medical care.74 
The Eighth Circuit, along with the Sixth Circuit, also found that 
shackling pregnant women during labor violated their Eighth Amend-
ment rights. In 2009, the Eighth Circuit heard Nelson v. Correctional 
Medical Services,75 which involved a former pregnant inmate who was 
shackled during labor.76 As a result of the restraints, Ms. Nelson suffers 
 
 67 Archer v. Dutcher, 733 F.2d 14, 16 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 68 Id. at 16. 
 69 Id. 
 70 849 F.2d 1117 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 71 Id. at 1120. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at 1123; see also Pool v. Sebastian Cty., 418 F.3d 934, 944 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating that 
it would have been obvious to even a layperson that a pregnant prisoner complaining of bleeding 
and extreme pain from cramping, which inhibited her ability to eat and shower, indicated that she 
needed medical attention); Coleman v. Rahija, 114 F.3d 778 (8th Cir. 1997) (stating that the nurse 
on duty’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s history of premature deliveries and failure to examine the 
plaintiff when she voiced her concerns showed the nurse’s deliberate indifference towards and 
actual knowledge of the plaintiff’s “serious medical need”). 
 75 583 F.3d 522 (8th Cir. 2009). 
 76 Id. at 526. 
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chronic pain in her now-deformed hips, which, according to her ortho-
pedist, refuse to go “back into the place where they need to be.”77 She 
can no longer play with her children, do anything athletic, sleep or lean 
on her left side, sit or stand for more than a short period of time, or have 
children.78 She was a non-violent offender, imprisoned for writing bad 
checks.79 The Eighth Circuit ultimately denied summary judgment for 
the defendant-officer, stating that shackling a pregnant inmate during 
childbirth has clearly been established as a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment.80 The Sixth Circuit in Villegas v. Metropolitan Govern-
ment of Davidson County81 also found that shackling pregnant detain-
ees in labor substantially endangers the expectant mother’s health and 
“offends contemporary standards of human decency such that the prac-
tice violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against the ‘unneces-
sary and wanton infliction of pain.’’’82 
2. D.C. and Ninth Circuits’ have found that inadequate medical 
care and shackling do not meet the deliberate indifference 
standard 
Unlike the Second, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, the D.C. and Ninth 
Circuits have concluded that inadequate medical care and shackling do 
not meet the deliberate indifference standard and, thus, do not violate 
detainees’ Eighth Amendment rights. In Women Prisoners of D.C. v. 
District of Columbia,83 female prisoners sued the District of Columbia 
for violating their Eighth Amendment rights by providing them with 
inadequate medical care, shackling them, and sexually abusing them.84 
The trial court had ruled in favor of the female inmates, but the D.C. 
Circuit reversed it. It rejected the provision in the district court’s order 
requiring that prisons have written protocols regarding prenatal care, 
reasoning that the district court lacked supplemental jurisdiction.85 It 
also rejected the district court’s order to hire a midwife to aid prisoners, 
 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 533. See also Brawley v. State of Wash., 712 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1221 (W.D. Wash. 
2010) (denying summary judgment because shackling a prisoner in labor has clearly been estab-
lished as an Eighth Amendment violation). 
 81 709 F.3d 563 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 82 Id. at 574. See also Villegas v. Davidson Cty., 789 F. Supp. 2d 895, 919 (M.D. Tenn. 2011) 
(holding that shackling a pregnant detainee in the final stages of labor shortly before birth and 
during the post-partum recovery and denying breast-pump post-partum infringes the Eighth 
Amendment). 
 83 93 F.3d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
 84 Id. at 913. 
 85 Id. at 932, 944. 
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to create a pre-natal clinic, and to provide for obstetrical examinations 
inside the detention facilities.86 The D.C. Circuit also refused to declare 
the use of restraints on pregnant detainees unconstitutional and re-
jected the district court’s standard.87 The D.C. Circuit reasoned that 
courts have no experience running prisons, and, thus, they should defer 
to prison officials’ judgments.88 
As recently as 2016, the Ninth Circuit has held that lack of prena-
tal necessities and shackling does not violate a prisoner’s Eighth 
Amendment rights.89 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit in Mendiola-Mar-
tinez v. Arpaio90 held that the following did not violate the Eighth 
Amendment: the county’s use of restraints on the prisoner during labor 
and postpartum recovery after a caesarian section, its failure to provide 
her with a breast pump, and its nutrition policy for pregnant inmates, 
even though the prisoner reports of being repeatedly hungry and having 
to drink water from the sink by her toilet.91 
B. Kingsley v. Hendrickson: A Different Standard for Pretrial Detain-
ees? 
Despite courts commonly including the Eighth Amendment’s delib-
erate indifference requirement in cases involving pretrial detainees, the 
Court recently expressed disagreement with this extension of the 
amendment. In particular, it rejected the idea that there is one deliber-
ate indifference standard that should be applied to all § 1983 claims 
regardless of whether they are brought by convicted prisoners or pre-
trial detainees. 
In Kingsley v. Hendrickson,92 a pretrial detainee brought an exces-
sive force claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. He alleged that officers, who had repeatedly asked him to 
remove the paper covering the light in his cell, used excessive force by 
handcuffing him, placing a knee in his back, slamming his head on con-
crete, and using a Taser on him.93 
The Court found that confinement conditions of a non-convicted de-
tainee violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments if they (1) impose 
some harm to [her] that either significantly exceed or are independent 
of the inherent discomforts of confinement and (2) are not reasonably 
 
 86 Id. at 923. 
 87 Id. at 931–32. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See generally Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 90 836 F.3d 1239 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 91 Id. at 1239, 1243. 
 92 135 S. Ct. 2466 (2015). 
 93 Id. at 2470. 
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related to a legitimate government objective or are excessive in relation 
to the legitimate governmental objective.94 Courts then must objectively 
assess if there is a reasonable relationship between the government’s 
conduct and a legitimate purpose.95 Thus, the Court held that the de-
tainee only needed to prove that the defendant’s conduct, used pur-
posely or knowingly against her, was objectively unreasonable, not that 
the defendant subjectively knew that the amount of force used was un-
reasonable or excessive.96 
The Court concluded the objective standard was the appropriate 
standard given its precedent. The Court has held that “pretrial detain-
ees (unlike convicted prisoners) cannot be punished at all, much less 
‘maliciously and sadistically.’”97 It also has held that “the Due Process 
Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that 
amounts to punishment,”98 which can include actions “taken with an 
‘expressed intent to punish.’”99 However, Bell further explained that if 
pretrial detainees cannot show an express intent to punish, they can 
still win their case by demonstrating that the defendants’ acts or omis-
sions are not “rationally related to a legitimate non-punitive govern-
mental purpose” or that the actions “appear excessive in relation to that 
purpose.”100 
Kingsley, though, did not address whether its objective standard 
applies to only excessive-force claims or to all Fourteenth-Amendment 
claims made by pretrial detainees. Courts have since debated this ques-
tion. Thus far, the Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuits have expressly 
found that the objective standard set forth in Kingsley applies to pre-
trial detainees’ other Fourteenth Amendment claims while the Eighth, 
Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits have declined to make such an extension. 
1. The Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuits’ extension of the 
Kingsley objective standard 
The Ninth Circuit was the first court of appeals to review Kingsley. 
In Castro v. County of Los Angeles,101 a pretrial detainee banged on his 
cell’s window to alert jail officials that the inmate placed in the same 
 
 94 Id. at 2473–74. 
 95 Id. at 2469. 
 96 Id. at 2472–73. 
 97 Id. at 2475 (internal citations omitted). 
 98 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989). 
 99 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979). 
 100 Id. at 561. 
 101 Castro v. Cty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 831 
(2017). 
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cell was combative and would likely harm him.102 Officials ignored him, 
though, and his cellmate ultimately beat and severely injured him.103 
He brought a § 1983 action, alleging violations of his Fourteenth 
Amendment right to be protected from the harm inflicted by other in-
mates.104 
The Ninth Circuit held that the objective standard of Kingsley was 
not limited to excessive-force claims, extending it to pretrial detainees’ 
Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-protect claims.105 It reasoned that 
the federal right and injuries suffered are the same for excessive force 
and failure-to-protect claims.106 It also recognized that both claims arise 
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment, es-
pecially given pretrial detainees’ different status than convicted prison-
ers.107 In addition, it observed that the Court in Kingsley did not confine 
its holding to “force” but rather stated that a pretrial detainee need only 
provide objective evidence that “the challenged governmental action” is 
unreasonably related to a legitimate government goal or is excessive in 
relation to its objective.108 Using an objective inquiry to evaluate liabil-
ity under § 1983, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict in favor of 
the detainee.109 It found sufficient evidence that the officers and the 
County knew their actions and policies posed a substantial risk of seri-
ous harm to the detainee but were deliberately indifferent to that 
risk.110 
After the Castro decision, the Second Circuit also extended Kings-
ley, applying its holding to pretrial detainees’ conditions of confinement 
complaints under the Fourteenth Amendment.111 In so doing, the Sec-
ond Circuit overruled its past decision in Caiozzo v. Koreman,112 which 
used a subjective test when evaluating a medical-care claim, given that 
the Court in Wilson113 found medical care to be a condition of confine-
ment.114 By the next year, the Second Circuit, like the Ninth Circuit, 
 
 102 Id. at 1064. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Id. at 1060. 
 105 Id. at 1070–71. 
 106 Id. at 1069–70. 
 107 Id. (citing to Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015)). 
 108 Id. at 1070 (citing to Kingsley, 135 S.Ct. at 2473–74). 
 109 Id. at 1060. The Ninth Circuit has since applied the Kingsley holding to a detainee’s medi-
cal-need claim. Gordon v. Cty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1120, 1122–25 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 110 Id. 
 111 Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 34–35 (2nd Cir. 2017). 
 112 581 F.3d 63 (2nd Cir. 2009). 
 113 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991). 
 114 Caiozzo, 581 F.3d at 66, 68, 70–72. 
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used the Kingsley objective standard in a case involving a claim of de-
liberate indifference to a serious medical need.115 The Second Circuit 
specifically asked “whether a ‘reasonable person’ would appreciate the 
risk to which the detainee was subjected.”116 
The Seventh Circuit most recently heard Miranda v. County of 
Lake,117 concerning the death of a pretrial detainee, an Indian national, 
due to severe dehydration at a county jail and her Estate’s claims under 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause for inadequate med-
ical care.118 The Seventh Circuit held that only the objective unreason-
ableness standard of Kingsley applied to pretrial detainees’ medical-
care claims brought under the Fourteenth Amendment.119 The Seventh 
Circuit first reasoned that the Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed 
courts to recognize pretrial detainees’ different status as compared to 
convicted prisoners’ status.120 Second, it noted that the Court has found 
that the analysis under the Eighth Amendment is “not coextensive” 
with that of the Due Process Clause given the different language and 
nature of the claims.121 To the Seventh Circuit, the Court’s reasoning in 
Kingsley did not indicate that its holding applied only to excessive-force 
claims but rather that it included other claims arising under the Four-
teenth Amendment.122 Thus, the district court improperly instructed 
the jury on intent; a jury, based on the evidence that the jail doctors 
knew Gomes was not eating or drinking, could have found that the de-
fendants purposefully, knowingly, or with reckless disregard chose to 
observe Gomes in jail rather than take her to a hospital.123 
2. The Fifth, Eleventh and Eighth Circuits’ refusal to extend the 
Kingsley objective standard 
The Fifth, Eleventh, and Eighth Circuits, on the other hand, have 
held that Kingsley applies only to pretrial detainees’ Fourteenth 
Amendment claims alleging excessive-force. Thus, they have limited 
the case to its facts. 
 
 115 Bruno v. City of Schenectady, 727 F. App’x 717, 720 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 116 Id. 
 117 900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 118 Id. at 335, 346. 
 119 Id. at 352. 
 120 Id. at 350, 352–53 (citing to Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2475 (2015)). 
 121 Miranda, 900 F.3d at 352 (citing Kingsley, 135 S.Ct. at 2475 and Currie v. Chhabra, 728 
F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[D]ifferent constitutional provisions, and thus different standards, 
govern depending on the relationship between the state and the person in the state’s custody.”)). 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. at 354. 
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In Alderson v. Concordia Parish Correctional Facility,124 a pretrial 
detainee was stabbed and stomped by two inmates.125 It took several 
complaints by the detainee and his family about his safety and medical 
condition for an officer to acknowledge his attack and take him to the 
hospital, where he was diagnosed with multiple broken ribs and numer-
ous puncture wounds to his head, face, and body.126 The plaintiff 
brought a § 1983 claim, alleging that the correctional facility provided 
him with “inadequate security and impermissibly delayed [his] medical 
care.”127 The Fifth Circuit found that court precedent applied the sub-
jective standard in cases decided after Kingsley; thus, the circuit’s rule 
of orderliness mandated that they continue to do so.128 The Fifth Circuit 
next asserted that, at the time, only the Ninth Circuit had extended the 
objective standard of Kingsley.129 Finally, it concluded that, even if 
Kingsley mandated the adoption of the objective standard for failure-to-
protect claims, the plaintiff did not make such a claim.130 Thus, under 
the subjective standard, the Fifth Circuit found that the detainee did 
not sufficiently demonstrate that officials acted with deliberate indif-
ference to a substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee when they 
incorrectly housed him with department of correction inmates, though 
there was some evidence that the officer acted with deliberate indiffer-
ence to his serious medical needs.131 
In Nam Dang, by & through Vina Dang v. Sheriff, Seminole 
County,132 the Eleventh Circuit heard a case in which a pretrial de-
tainee developed meningitis in jail, which resulted in him having 
strokes that permanently injured him.133 The plaintiff alleged that he 
received constitutionally deficient medical care due to deliberate indif-
ference.134 He further argued that he need not show deliberate differ-
ence due to Kingsley.135 The Eleventh Circuit, though, held there was 
no need to decide whether the objective standard applied.136 Kingsley 
 
 124 848 F.3d 415 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 125 Id. at 418. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 415. 
 128 Id. at 419 n.4 (citing Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 1996)). See also Estate 
of Henson v. Wichita Cty., 795 F.3d 456 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 129 Alderson, 848 F.3d at 419 n.4. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 420–21. 
 132 871 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 133 Id. at 1276–78. 
 134 Id. at 1276. 
 135 Id. at 1279 n.2. 
 136 Id. 
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only involved an excessive force claim.137 Moreover, the decision would 
not help the detainee even if it could be applied because the Court noted 
that “liability for negligently inflicted harm is categorically beneath the 
threshold of constitutional due process.”138 And, to the Fifth Circuit, the 
jail nurse’s failure to treat Dang’s symptoms and her misdiagnosis was, 
at most, negligence.139 
The Eighth Circuit in Whitney v. City of St. Louis140 stated that 
Kingsley did not apply because the detainee brought a deliberate indif-
ference case rather than excessive force case.141 Under the subjective 
standard, then, the Eighth Circuit found that the father of a pretrial 
detainee who hanged himself in a jail cell did not sufficiently allege that 
the officer knew of the detainee’s suicidal thoughts or that the munici-
pal policy was deliberately indifferent.142 
Therefore, while the Fifth, Eleventh, and Eighth Circuits refuse to 
read Kingsley as applying to claims other than excessive-force, the 
Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuits apply Kingsley’s objective stand-
ard to other Fourteenth Amendment claims. Given the Fourteenth-
Amendment claims likely to be brought by pregnant detainees in light 
of the mistreatment and inadequate medical attention in detention cen-
ters, courts will have to decide which of the circuits to follow. 
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE RIGHTS TO DIGNITY AND TO BE FREE 
FROM CRUEL, INHUMANE PUNISHMENT 
International law has also addressed the treatment of prisoners. 
Most notably, international law bars cruel and inhumane punishment 
through various treaties and U.N. General Assembly Resolutions. Spe-
cifically, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”),143 the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), the 
American Convention on Human Rights (“American Convention”), and 
the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”) all state that “[n]o one shall 
be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.”144 
The CAT defines torture as:  
 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. (citing to Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015)) (emphasis in original). 
 139 Dang, 871 F.3d at 1276–78, 1279 n.2. 
 140 887 F.3d 857 (8th Cir. 2018). 
 141 Id. at 860 n.4. 
 142 Id. at 857. 
 143 The U.S. is a signatory to the UDHR. 
 144 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948); 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; Or-
ganization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, art. 5(2), Nov. 22, 1969, 
1144 U.N.T.S. 143. 
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[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or 
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . for any reason 
based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering 
is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or ac-
quiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity.145  
The CAT also bars “other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment which do not amount to torture as defined in article I, 
when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an 
official capacity.”146 The CAT, ratified by the United States in 1994, 
mandates that all State Parties “shall take effective legislative, admin-
istrative, judicial, or other measures to prevent acts of torture in any 
territory under its jurisdiction.”147 
The ICCPR, which the United States signed in 1977 and ratified in 
1992, further requires that “[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall 
be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of 
the human person.”148 The American Convention, signed by the United 
States, similarly mandates that “[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty 
shall be treated with respect for the inherent dignity of the human per-
son.”149 
The United Nations has also developed rules prohibiting shackling 
specifically.150 For example, Rule 24 of the United Nations Rules for the 
Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for 
Women Offenders, otherwise known as the Bangkok Rules, expressly 
states that “instruments of restraint shall never be used on women dur-
ing labour, during birth and immediately after birth.”151 The United 
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, oth-
erwise known as the Mandela Rules, bars the use of restraints as pun-
ishment, though it does acknowledge their use for clear, narrow excep-
tions.152 
 
 145 U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, art. 1(1), Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
 146 Id. at art. 16(1). 
 147 Id. at art. 2(1). 
 148 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 144, at art. 10. 
 149 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 144, at art. 5(2). 
 150 These rules are included in United Nations General Assembly Resolutions. They are not 
signed and ratified by each individual Member State but rather are adopted by the General As-
sembly, which consists of one representative from each Member State. For more information, see 
General Assembly of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS (2018), http://www.un.org/en/ga/ [https:/ 
/perma.cc/57DC-NRL8]. 
 151 G.A. Res. 65/229, ¶ 24 (Dec. 21, 2010) (emphasis added). 
 152 G.A. Res. 70/175, U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Dec. 17, 
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Since the inception of these treaties, the United Nations Human 
Rights Committee has clarified their meaning. For example, it found 
the goal of Article 7 of the ICCPR, expressing freedom from torture or 
inhumane treatment, was to “protect both the dignity and the physical 
and mental integrity of the individual.”153 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee further examined 
Article 7 in Mellet v. Ireland.154 The Committee found that Ireland, by 
prohibiting and criminalizing abortion and preventing Mellet from ac-
cessing medical care, subjected a highly vulnerable pregnant woman to 
severe physical and mental suffering.155 The committee pointed out that 
her anguish could have been avoided if the state had given her proper 
health care.156 As a result, the state violated, among other rights, her 
right to freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment under Ar-
ticle 7 of the ICCPR.157 The Committee noted that the fact that an act 
is legal under domestic law does not stop it from violating Article 7; the 
article is absolute and without exception, thus leaving no room for any 
excuses.158 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee, along with the 
United Nations Committee Against Torture and United Nations Special 
Rapporteurs on Torture and on Violence against Women, have also ad-
vocated for all States to stop using restraints on women during their 
pregnancy and while they are recovering thereafter.159 For example, the 
Committee against Torture expressed concern about the United States’ 
treatment of female detainees, especially its shackling women detain-
ees during labor and use of “gender-based humiliation,” and requested 
 
2015). 
 153 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment 20, Article 7, Compilation of General Com-
ments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/Gen/1/Rev.1 (1994), http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/gencomm/hrcom20.htm [https://perma.c 
c/362H-PUFT]. 
 154 Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 2324/2013, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/116/D/2324/ 
2013 (2016). 
 155 Id. ¶ 7.4. 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 7.6. 
 158 Id. at 7.4, 7.6. 
 159 Amnesty International, Abuse of Women in Custody: Sexual Misconduct and the Shackling 
of Pregnant Women at 2 (2001); U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment: Promotion and Pro-
tection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Including the 
Right to Development, ¶ 41, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/3 (Jan. 15, 2008); Comm. on Human Rights, Report 
of the Mission to the United States of America on the Issue of Violence against Women in State and 
Federal Prisons, ¶¶ 53–54, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/68/Add.2 (Jan. 4, 1999); U.N. Human Rights 
Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its Causes, and Conse-
quences: Ms. Rashida Manjoo: Mission to the United States of America, ¶ C(h), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17  
/26/Add.5 (Jun. 6, 2011). 
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that the State adopt the necessary policies to bring it back into “con-
formity with international standards.”160 
IV. COURTS SHOULD FOLLOW THE NINTH, SECOND, AND SEVENTH 
CIRCUITS’ INTERPRETATION OF KINGSLEY 
In light of the mistreatment of pregnant immigrant detainees, 
which has been exacerbated due to the new ICE directive allowing for 
the detainment of pregnant women in their first and second trimesters, 
pregnant immigrant detainees will most likely bring more § 1983 
claims, alleging inadequate conditions of confinement and delayed med-
ical care due to deliberate indifference. When faced with these claims, 
courts should mirror the Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuits by apply-
ing the objective standard set forth in Kingsley to all Fourteenth 
Amendment claims brought by pretrial detainees, such as failure-to-
protect and serious medical needs claims. 
First, such a standard acknowledges the different protections that 
pretrial detainees are afforded. Indeed, the Court has held time and 
again that pretrial detainees have not been charged with anything and 
thus cannot be punished.161 Immigrant detainees, such as pregnant 
women held in detention centers, might be held to an even higher stand-
ard than pretrial criminal detainees.162 Thus, courts around the country 
should use a standard that does not make it harder for pretrial detain-
ees to receive the protections that the Court has already held they are 
due. Rather, it should be enough that a reasonable person could find 
that the conditions or lack of adequate medical care non-convicted per-
son was unreasonable.163 
In addition, the objective standard might better adhere to constitu-
tional standards given that it does not engage in the subjective deliber-
ate indifference standard of an Eighth Amendment analysis. Indeed, 
 
 160 U.N. Comm. Against Torture, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against 
Torture: United States of America, ¶ 33, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (2006). 
 161 See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535–39 (1979). 
 162 See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896). Although they have not come to 
an official consensus, courts have repeatedly held that immigration detainees are afforded at least 
the same due process protections as pretrial criminal detainees. See Edwards v. Johnson, 209 F.3d 
772, 778 (5th Cir. 2000); Dahlan v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 215 F. App’x 97, 100 (3d Cir. 2007). 
But see Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 933–34 (9th Cir. 2004). For more information, see Tom 
Jawetz, Litigating Immigration Detention Conditions, ACLU NATIONAL PRISON PROJECT (2008), 
https://law.ucdavis.edu/alumni/alumni-events/files/mcle-files/jawetz_detention_conditions.pdf [ht 
tps://perma.cc/VTY4-TWB2]. 
 163 See Kyla Magun, A Changing Landscape for Pretrial Detainees? The Potential Impact of 
Kingsley v. Hendrickson on Jail-Suicide Litigation, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 2059, 2085 n.169 (2016) 
(quoting Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining in Abuses of Executive Power Through Substantive Due 
Process, 60 FLA. L. REV. 519, 571 (2008) (“A showing of objective deliberate indifference, combined 
with some showing of more than de minimis injury, shocks the conscience and thus should sustain 
a substantive due process claim.”)). 
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the Court has repeatedly stated that the Eighth Amendment analysis 
is not the same as the Due Process Clause analysis; they differ in lan-
guage and in the nature of their claims.164 Thus, the objective standard 
could veer courts away from intertwining the analyses of the Eighth 
Amendment and Due Process Clause, which in some courts has proved 
detrimental to detainees’ cases.165 
The Kingsley decision is also broadly worded. As the Ninth Circuit 
pointed out, Kingsley’s holding is not limited to “force.”166 Instead, the 
Court asserted that pretrial detainees need only provide objective evi-
dence that “the challenged governmental action” is unreasonably re-
lated to a legitimate government goal or is excessive in relation to its 
objective.167 Thus, this wording indicates that the Court meant for its 
holding to apply to all Fourteenth Amendment claims brought by de-
tainees. This especially makes sense in light of the fact that the injuries, 
both physical and constitutional, suffered in excessive force claims and 
other Fourteenth Amendment claims are the same.168 
Furthermore, evidence exists that another circuit might join the 
Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuit interpretation of Kingsley—the 
Sixth Circuit. Despite both parties’ failure to raise arguments concern-
ing Kingsley, the Sixth Circuit in Richmond v. Huq169 acknowledged the 
change in Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference jurispru-
dence that “calls into serious doubt” whether detainees such as the 
plaintiff are required to demonstrate defendants’ subjective awareness, 
and wanton disregard, of detainees’ serious medical conditions.170 This 
reading of Kingsley mirrors the objective, reasonable person standard 
set forth in the Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuits and, thus, shows 
that the Sixth Circuit is inclined to follow their lead. 
The Fifth Circuit might also include proponents of the Kingsley ob-
jective standard. Although Judge Graves in Alderson concurred in part, 
he encouraged the Fifth Circuit to reevaluate applying the subjective 
standard to pretrial detainees’ other Fourteenth Amendment claims 
given the Kingsley holding.171 
 
 164 Miranda, 900 F.3d at 352 (citing to Kingsley, 135 S.Ct. at 2475 and to Currie v. Chhabra, 
728 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[D]ifferent constitutional provisions, and thus different stand-
ards, govern depending on the relationship between the state and the person in the state’s cus-
tody.”)). 
 165 See Women Prisoners of D.C. v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d at 931–32; Mendiola-Martinez 
v. Arpaio, 836 F.3d 1239, 1243 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 166 Castro v. Cty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
831 (2017). 
 167 Id. (citing to Kingsley, 135 S.Ct. at 2473–74). 
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 170 Id. at 938 n.3. 
 171 Alderson v. Concordia Parish Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 424–25 (5th Cir. 2017) (Graves, 
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A. Counter-Arguments to Emulating the Ninth, Second, and Seventh 
Circuits 
Critics might argue that Fourth Circuit offers support to the 
Eighth, Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits’ interpretation of Kingsley. For ex-
ample, the Fourth Circuit in Duff v. Potter172 still examined a detainee’s 
inadequate medical treatment claim under the deliberate indifference 
standard while analyzing his excessive-force claim under the objective 
reasonableness standard. But the Fourth Circuit, unlike the Sixth Cir-
cuit, did not expressly contemplate the application of Kingsley to other 
Fourteenth Amendment claims of pretrial detainees. Moreover, after 
Kingsley, the Seventh Circuit still applied the deliberate indifference 
standard under the Eighth Amendment to inadequate medical care 
claims before joining the Ninth and Second Circuits with its holding in 
Miranda v. County of Lake, which leaves it open for the Fourth Circuit 
to follow the same path.173 Therefore, it is hard to say that the Fourth 
Circuit supports the Eighth, Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits’ holdings. 
In addition, supporters of the Eighth, Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits 
might contend that the application of Kingsley to claims other than 
those of excessive force is in conflict with the Court’s decision in Daniels 
v. Williams.174 In that case, the Court overruled Parratt v. Taylor175 in 
part and concluded that negligent conduct does not offend the Due Pro-
cess Clause.176 Opponents of the objective-reasonableness standard 
might be concerned that Kingsley’s objective-reasonableness standard 
will allow negligence to be sufficient for liability and, thus, will conflict 
with Daniels by constitutionalizing medical malpractice claims. 
Kingsley, though, does not hold that negligence suffices for liability. 
Rather it stated that courts must consider two separate state-of-mind 
questions. First, they must inquire into the defendant’s state of mind 
concerning his physical actions—“i.e., his state of mind with respect to 
the bringing about of certain physical consequences in the world.”177 
Then they must determine the defendant’s state of mind “with respect 
to whether this use of force was ‘excessive,’” using an objective standard 
and thus ensuring the defendant’s state of mind is not a matter that a 
plaintiff has to prove.178 Unlike the second objective inquiry, then, the 
 
J., specially concurring in part). 
 172 665 F. App’x 242, 244–45 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 173 See, e.g., Phillips v. Sheriff of Cook Cty., 828 F.3d 541, 554 n.31 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 174 474 U.S. 327 (1986). 
 175 451 U.S. 527 (1981). 
 176 Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330–31. See Castro v. Cty. of L.A., 833 F.3d 1060, 1071 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(en banc), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct. 831 (2017). 
 177 Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2015). 
 178 Id. 
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first question asks courts to decipher whether defendants have acted 
purposefully, knowingly, or recklessly when they thought about the con-
sequences of their actions concerning the pretrial detainee.179 The 
Ninth Circuit and other courts of appeals, upon hearing detainees’ 
claims, have acknowledged that Kingsley requires a detainee to “prove 
more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin 
to reckless disregard.”180 
B. The Effect of the Objective Standard on Pregnant Immigrant De-
tainees 
In addition to adopting Ninth, Second, and Seventh Circuit prece-
dent, courts should also interpret Kingsley to apply the objective stand-
ard to all Fourteenth Amendment, § 1983 claims of pretrial detainees 
because it will likely allow pregnant immigrant detainees to be more 
successful in their serious medical need, failure-to-protect, and condi-
tions of confinement claims. Rather than show actual knowledge, preg-
nant immigrant detainees would only have to show that, under the cir-
cumstances, detention officials and staff should have known they 
needed medical attention. It seems that this standard would prove 
fruitful in pregnant immigrant detainees’ cases given that most, if not 
all, claim that at least one official was alerted to their condition, their 
discomfort, or their bleeding and did nothing to alleviate it.181 
In fact, under the Kingsley holding, courts could find that the inhu-
mane treatment of pregnant detainees violates their Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. First, these practices of endangering women’s 
health exceeds and is independent of the inherent discomforts of con-
finement.182 It does not serve a legitimate penological purpose to allow 
a pregnant woman to miscarry in a jail cell or to provide such poor con-
ditions that she develops depression.183 In addition, precautionary 
measures such as shackling might be related to an often-upheld govern-
mental interest in ensuring safety but ultimately are excessive, espe-
cially given that a guard accompanies a detainee everywhere outside 
her cell, including the delivery room.184 
 
 179 See Miranda v. Cty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 353 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 180 Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071. See also Gordon v. Cty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1120, 1122–25 
(9th Cir. 2018); Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 36, 36 n.16. 
 181 See generally American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2. 
 182 Kingsley, 135 S.Ct. at 2473–74. 
 183 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). 
 184 The ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project and ACLU National Prison Project, supra note 
23, at 5. 
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It will also likely be easier for a detainee to hold officials accounta-
ble under the objective deliberate indifference standard given the deci-
sions of the circuit split. Whereas every circuit that heard cases using 
the objective standard rendered judgment in favor of detainees, the 
other circuit courts, i.e. the Eleventh, Eighth, and Fifth, did not despite 
officials knowing about detainees’ injuries or illnesses and failing or de-
laying to give them the treatment they are afforded under the Four-
teenth Amendment.185 
Immigrant detainees in particular have already had some success 
in gaining judgments in their favor. For example, the Ninth Circuit, 
using the objective deliberate indifference standard, upheld a district 
court’s order to provide clean bedding, personal hygiene accommoda-
tions, and medical screenings as well as monitor compliance and ensure 
implementation.186 
The objective standard would not only provide a more favorable 
standard for pretrial detainees, but it could also change current policies 
concerning pregnant detainees. As will be discussed in Section VI be-
low, Congress has left some loopholes in its current and pending legis-
lation that allows for detention officials and medical staff to exercise 
their discretion when making decisions regarding pregnant detainees’ 
medical treatment or shackling.187 This discretionary standard has ren-
dered its laws null and void because staff and officials often abuse the 
standard and have continued to mistreat and shackle pregnant in-
mates.188 If courts use the objective standard when evaluating pretrial 
detainees’ claims, they could not only discontinue the deference given 
to detention officials189 but also signal to Congress and state legisla-
tures that making allowances for officials’ discretion is no longer viable. 
Detention staff also might refrain from mistreatment or act with more 
diligence, knowing that the court will look at their actions from the per-
spective of a reasonable person rather than simply looking at their ver-
sion of events. 
 
 185 See Alderson v. Concordia Parish Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 418 (5th Cir. 2017); Dang v. 
Sheriff, Seminole Cty., 871 F.3d 1272, 1276—78 (11th Cir. 2017); Whitney v. City of St. Louis, 887 
F.3d 857, 861 (8th Cir. 2018). 
 186 Doe v. Kelly, 878 F.3d 710, 721–25 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 187 See the discussion of the First Step Act and the Stop Shackling Act in Section VI below. 
 188 See generally American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2. 
 189 See Women Prisoners of D.C. v. District of Columbia, 93 F.3d 910, 931–32 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
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V. COURTS SHOULD USE INTERNATIONAL LAW AS PERSUASIVE 
AUTHORITY TO SUPPORT THEIR ADOPTION OF THE OBJECTIVE 
STANDARD 
Given the current circuit split, courts should refer to international 
law as persuasive authority.190 Upon reviewing international law, they 
will find that ICE policies and practices violate pregnant detainees’ 
rights to freedom from cruel, inhuman treatment, to dignity, and to be 
treated with humanity. Given this clear contravention of the ICCPR, 
the CAT, the American Convention, the UDHR, the Bangkok Rules, and 
the Mandela Rules, courts might be more persuaded to follow the ex-
amples of the Seventh, Ninth, and Second Circuits and extend the 
Kingsley decision given that they are more consistent with the interna-
tional law approach. 
As aforementioned, the ICCPR, the CAT, the American Conven-
tion, and the UDHR prohibit cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.191 The treatment, especially officials’ inadequate attention 
to pregnant detainees’ miscarriages, clearly violates this prohibition. 
Indeed, like Mellet, detention officials have prevented or delayed highly 
vulnerable pregnant women from receiving medical care and contrib-
uted to their mental and physical pain, which could have been avoided 
if they had chosen to pay attention to detainees’ needs.192 Thus, similar 
to Ireland, the United States has violated detainees’ right to freedom 
from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. 
Furthermore, the pain and suffering that pregnant detainees have 
reported193 falls within, at the very least, the CAT definition of “cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment.”194 Specifically, pregnant detainees 
have suffered both physically, receiving gashes from shackles and en-
during miscarriages due to lack of medical attention, and mentally, suf-
fering from stress, anxiety, and depression brought on by detention cen-
ters’ conditions and re-traumatization.195 The anguish has also been 
inflicted and acquiesced by officials given their refusal to acknowledge 
 
 190 See Sichel, supra note 26, at 237–239 (describing in detail how international human rights 
law is persuasive authority and citing to federal cases that have used international law as persua-
sive authority). 
 191 See e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 144; International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights art. 7, supra note 144; American Convention on Human Rights, art. 5(2), supra note 144. 
 192 See Human Rights Committee, supra note 154. 
 193 See generally O’Connor, supra note 1; American Civil Liberties Union et al., supra note 2. 
 194 U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, supra note 145, at art. 16(1). 
 195 This also contravenes Article 7 of the ICCPR in that it does not “protect both the dignity 
and the physical and mental integrity of the individual.” U.N. Human Rights Committee, supra 
note 153. 
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or their dismissal of women’s cries for help, profuse bleeding, and obvi-
ous need for medical treatment. 
The continued shackling of pregnant detainees also violates the in-
ternational prohibitions against torture and inhuman treatment, Rule 
24 of the Bangkok Rules,196 and the Mandela Rules.197 Indeed, the U.S. 
has not complied with treaties’ requirements that it implement domes-
tic mechanisms to prevent such mistreatment.198 The UN Human 
Rights Committee, the UN Committee against Torture, and the UN 
Special Rapporteurs on Torture and on Violence Against Women199 
have repeatedly denounced this inaction, asserting that the United 
States has failed to uphold modern standards of decency.200 
It is also apparent that detention centers have been violating preg-
nant detainees’ rights to dignity and to be treated with humanity under 
the ICCPR and the American Convention.201 As the Eighth Circuit in-
sinuated, it is quite obvious that a woman bleeding out in her cell is 
indication that she needs medical attention.202 Yet detention officers 
and medical staff continue to ignore women’s needs, such as when they 
left E lying in a pool of her blood for eight days or when they fail to 
inquire about detainees’ mental health, especially when their pregnan-
cies are a result of rape.203 Anyone can observe that such mistreatment 
of pregnant detainees does not afford them dignity and treats them as 
less than human. 
 
 196 G.A. Res. 65/229, ¶ 24 (Dec. 21, 2010). 
 197 G.A. Res. 70/175, U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (Jan. 8, 
2016). 
 198 U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, supra note 145, at art. 2(1). 
 199 See U.N. Human Rights Council, supra note 159. 
 200 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). 
 201 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 144, at art. 10; Amer-
ican Convention on Human Rights, supra note 144, at art. 5(2). 
 202 See Pool v. Sebastian Cty., 418 F.3d 934, 935 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 203 See O’Connor, supra note 1. 
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Some critics might be skeptical about the role of international 
law204 in courts’ interpretation of the United States Constitution.205 
However, the Court has acknowledged the importance of the interna-
tional consensus on basic human rights and the value of foreign laws 
when deciding the constitutionality of certain acts.206 For example, the 
Court determined that the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning 
from evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a matur-
ing society.”207 This interpretation of standards came from reviewing 
the laws and universal belief of “civilized people” and the “civilized na-
tions of the world.”208 Estelle further elaborated on “contemporary 
standards” of decency by asserting that the infliction of unnecessary 
suffering was inconsistent with them.209 
Reviewing international law, then, should sway courts to extend 
the objective standard to claims beyond excessive-force. Indeed, inter-
national law does not review the official actor’s intent but rather has 
 
 204 Given the universal acceptance that international law exists and the extensive research set 
forth in other academic articles on international law, this Comment will not spend time arguing 
that international law exists. Rather it will remind its readers that the United States Supreme 
Court has acknowledge international law since the 1800s. See The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388, 423 (1815) 
(citing to the “law of nations”); The Paquete Habana; The Lola, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (“[I]nter-
national law is part of our law.”). For more on international law, especially in the context of female 
prisoners and detainees, see generally Sichel, supra note 26; Martin A. Geer, Human Rights and 
Wrongs in Our Own Backyard: Incorporating International Human Rights Protections under Do-
mestic Civil Rights Law—A Case Study of Women in United States Prisons, 13 HARV. HUM. RTS. 
J. 71 (2000); Vicki C. Jackson, Ambivalent Resistance and Comparative Constitutionalism: Open-
ing Up the Conversation on Proportionality, Rights and Federalism, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 583, 638 
(1999); Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 
1235 (1999). 
 205 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 607 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the 
Court’s use of international sources when interpreting Constitutional provisions such as the 
Eighth Amendment.); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J. dissenting) 
(“Where there is not first a settled consensus among our own people, the view of other nations, 
however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be imposed upon 
Americans . . . .”). See also Stephen M. Schwebel, The Effect of Resolutions of the U.N. General 
Assembly on Customary International Law, 73 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING (AMERICAN 
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW) 301, 301 (1979) (stipulating that U.N. General Assembly Reso-
lutions are not binding); Gregory J. Kerwin, The Role of United Nations General Assembly Resolu-
tions in Determining Principles of International Law in United States Courts, 1983 DUKE L.J. 876, 
877 (1983) (arguing that General Assembly Resolutions are not “independent, authoritative 
sources of international law”). 
 206 See e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002) (using comparative and interna-
tional law to determine that capital punishment for the mentally ill is unconstitutional); Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 573, 577 (2003) (relying on a European Court of Human Rights decision, 
Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, as guidance to find that a person’s choice to engage in consensual 
homosexual activity is a protected liberty interest). 
 207 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). 
 208 Id. at 101–04. 
 209 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). See also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 
(2005) (finding other countries’ practices and opinions to be “respected and significant confirmation 
of [their] own conclusions” and to show the “centrality of those same rights within [the United 
States’] own heritage of freedom”). 
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made blanket prohibitions on mistreatment, inadequate medical care, 
and shackling of detainees and prisoners. Thus, courts should be per-
suaded that extending the objective standard would uphold interna-
tional law and modern global standards of decency. 
VI. CURRENT AND PENDING U.S. LEGISLATION DOES NOT APPLY TO OR 
PROPERLY PROTECT PREGNANT DETAINEES 
Critics could argue that the First Step Act,210 signed into law on 
December 21, 2018 by President Trump, bars shackling of pregnant 
women in addition to other significant criminal justice reforms.211 Thus, 
the Comment’s aforementioned arguments are unnecessary. 
But this prohibition on the use of restraints applies to prisoners 
who are pregnant or are recovering postpartum.212 For the purposes of 
the new law, “prisoners” only include people “sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment pursuant to a conviction for a Federal criminal offense, 
or a person in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), including a 
person in a Bureau of Prisons Contracted Facility.”213 In theory, this 
could extend to pregnant detainees given that ICE used five federal 
prisons to house approximately 1,600 immigrant detainees through 
temporary interagency agreements with the Bureau of Prisons.214 In-
deed, such June 2018 agreements, needed to accommodate the overflow 
of detainees in detention centers, are valid until June 2019.215 In prac-
tice, however, no immigrant detainees have been put in federal prisons 
since November 2018.216 Using federal prisons to house detainees was 
unprecedented and highly controversial given that most detainees were 
asylum seekers yet were treated like criminals.217 Some attorneys have 
expressed doubt that federal prisons will be employed again given that 
using federal prisons to detain immigrants and asylum seekers violated 
 
 210 First Step Act, S. 3649, 115th Cong. (2d Sess. 2018). 
 211 Id.; see also Lauren Kuhlik, Congress Just Took a Big Step Toward Ending the Shackling 
of Pregnant Prisoners, ACLU (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/prisoners-rights/women-
prison/congress-just-took-big-step-toward-ending-shackling-pregnant [https://perma.cc/LV38-K8P 
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 217 Conrad Wilson, ICE Appears to End Use of Federal Prisons, supra note 215. 
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their constitutional rights and that more facilities are now being built 
on the southern border.218 
Critics could also contend that recent legislation specifically bars 
the mistreatment and shackling of detainees. The first is the twenty-
ninth amendment of the Homeland Security Appropriations Bill for Fis-
cal Year 2019, which limits the use of restraints on detainees who are 
pregnant or in post-partum recuperation.219 The second piece of legisla-
tion is Senator Patty Murray’s Senate Bill 3225, or the Stop Shackling 
and Detaining Pregnant Women Act, introduced on July 17, 2018.220 
The Act purports to “ensure the humane treatment of pregnant women 
by reinstating the presumption of release and prohibiting shackling, re-
straining, and other inhumane treatment of pregnant detainees.”221 The 
bill, as of January 4, 2019, has made no movement within the Senate 
since its introduction.222 
Despite the well-intentioned provisions of the amendment, the 
First Step Act, and the Stop Shackling Act, the legislation, if passed, 
will not protect pregnant women due to some very large loopholes: they 
allow for the detainment and shackling of women in “extraordinary cir-
cumstances.”223 An appropriate official may individually determine that 
a pregnant detainee is a “serious flight risk” or “poses an immediate 
and serious threat to herself or others” and “cannot be prevented by 
other means.”224 A medical or healthcare professional also has the au-
thority to request that pregnant women be restrained in the interest of 
women’s medical safety.225 These officials are to use the least restrictive 
restraints possible and may not use shackles during labor.226 
While it may seem that this serves a compelling governmental in-
terest, i.e. protecting others and the detainee from herself, it ends up 
harming pregnant detainees in practice. Indeed, despite past and cur-
rent legislation, the discretion allotted to detention officers has allowed 
for the continuation of mistreatment and shackling of pregnant detain-
ees, including during labor.227 The “least restrictive means” constraint 
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 219 House Appropriations Committee, Amendments Adopted to the Homeland Security Appro-
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is ineffective given how easily officers circumvent, and thus abuse, the 
requirement; they can simply cite to their determination that the shack-
ling was necessary.228 Detention staff also often lack proper education 
about the law and, thus, believe their mistreatment is not illegal.229 De-
tention officers and medical professionals’ broad discretion and lack of 
education are compounded by the lack of oversight. The Trump admin-
istration’s ICE directive disabled the reporting mechanisms that al-
lowed outside organizations to supervise ICE’s detention officers, thus 
ensuring that officials are not held accountable for unreasonable deter-
minations.230 Therefore, the exceptions essentially nullify the prohibi-
tion. 
Furthermore, the use of the extraordinary circumstances provision 
is unjustified given that, thus far, lack of restraints on pregnant women 
has not jeopardized anyone’s safety. Pregnant detainees in civil deten-
tion have not been convicted of any crimes, or most notably, any violent 
crimes.231 Rather they are usually seeking asylum due to violence in 
their home countries.232 None of the states where shackling pregnant 
inmates is barred have reported that women in labor have escaped or 
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harmed themselves, the public, medical staff, or correctional officers.233 
Armed officers also usually guard shackled women, staying in or around 
their delivery room, which many argue is adequate to protect all—doc-
tors, nurses, the mother, and the newborn—involved.234 Finally, women 
giving birth are in no condition to flee or strike out in violence. 
Given the ongoing abuses, detention, and lack of education and ove-
rsight, many organizations and individuals who work with and advo-
cate for pregnant detainees doubt that the legislation will actually 
change officials’ behavior, finding the acts to be unsustainable.235 To 
create long-term change, lawmakers must work on mechanisms to edu-
cate detention officers, enforce these measures, and allow for third-
party supervision. Without such measures, legislation like the amend-
ment, the First Step Act, and the Stop Shackling Act will continue to be 
ignored and, thus, rendered meaningless. 
CONCLUSION
In light of the harsh policy the Trump administration had adopted, 
it will ultimately be up to the courts to ensure that pregnant immigrant 
detainees are treated humanely and with dignity. They can take a step 
towards ensuring this by following the example of the Ninth, Second, 
and Seventh Circuits and interpreting Kingsley to extend to Fourteenth 
Amendment claims other than excessive force. This determination is 
supported by precedent that bars the punishment of pretrial detainees 
and calls for scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment, not the Eighth 
Amendment. Furthermore, using international law as persuasive au-
thority should convince courts to favor the Ninth, Second, and Seventh 
Circuits’ interpretation of Kingsley given that the mistreatment of preg-
nant detainees is outlawed by several binding treaties, such as the 
ICCPR and the CAT, which view these human rights violations objec-
tively, not subjectively. 
If courts follow this interpretation of Kingsley, it will likely have a 
positive impact on pregnant detainees, making them more likely to 
have successful outcomes when bringing § 1983 claims and holding de-
tention officials more accountable for their disregard for pregnant de-
tainees’ rights. Moreover, it could alter current policies and legislation 
by signaling to Congress that it must close the gaps that allow for def-
erence to detention centers and its officers who abuse their discretion. 
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With these actions, the United States will be closer to ensuring that 
another pregnant immigrant detainee does not say #MeToo. 
